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PRIVACY AS A COLLECTIVE NORM
John Shaeffer and Charlie Nelson Keever *
As the economic value of aggregating personal data has grown, so too
have concerns over the economic power “owning” such data gives to those
who collect it. Existing legal regimes governing data privacy have struggled
to strike a balance between protecting personal privacy and preserving the
economic efficiencies that can be gained by permitting the collection and
exploitation of personal data. This Article proposes a collective re-conceptualization of one subset of personal data: information about what we do,
say, and like. This data has little value in isolation—it only becomes valuable when combined with the information about what others do, say, and like.
When so combined, this “big data” should be viewed, not as personal property, but as a collective norm. Those who collect this data deserve compensation in exchange for the economic efficiencies that its collection provides;
but complete and unlimited ownership of that data—the result of the existing
“private property” framework—is too rich. The Article explains how we
arrived at the existing legal regime governing data privacy, evaluates existing structures to explain why they do not and cannot work, and argues that a
reconceptualization of privacy makes sense economically, culturally, and
morally. This Article concludes by suggesting a regulatory structure that
might better serve all interested parties when privacy is considered as a collective norm.

*
John Shaeffer is a partner at the firm Fox Rothschild. The views he expresses herein are his own.
Charlie Nelson Keever is a Staff Attorney at the University of San Francisco School of Law’s
Racial Justice Clinic. She is a proud alumna of Loyola Law School of Los Angeles where she
served as editor-in-chief of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States built its privacy protection scheme on the notion that
privacy is property. Privacy is thus subject to an individual’s own decisionmaking authority. As personal property, when an individual transacts to receive something in exchange for information about what they do, say, or like,
what is transferred becomes the property of its acquirer. The acquirer, as the
property’s new owner, is thereafter free to exploit whatever economic advantage it can derive therefrom and exclude its use by others. Treating the
information that entities like Google, Facebook, or Amazon acquire in exchange for our use of their services—information reflecting what we do, say,
and like—as their property to exploit has created an insurmountable barrier
to competition against them. 1 A barrier never anticipated, and consequently
not accounted for, by our existing competition and privacy laws. 2
It is now beyond question that data concerning what we collectively
do, say, and like has cultural significance and economic value. What remains
difficult is determining precisely what is private and what is public in various
contexts. The existing privacy regime effectively cedes to private, for-profit
corporations the norms surrounding the balance of the economic and social
benefits of the broad collection of what we do, say, and like against the detriments of this practice. Not only is this system ineffectual for its purpose,
it is also anti-egalitarian, placing the burdens on those less privileged and
allowing the privileged to reap more of the benefits. 3
This Article proposes a shift in our mindset. What we do, say, and like
is our collective contribution to the society in which we live. It is something
distinct from what we internally think, feel, and believe, as well as that which
fits within more traditional notions of privacy like our physical spaces, physical possessions, or sensitive information like our bank account number or
medical information.
Since societies began, its members have made social contributions to
their communities by doing, saying, and liking—expressing publicly what
they privately thought, felt, and believed. We in the United States like
1. Brian Fung, ‘Near-perfect market intelligence’: Why a House Report Says Big Tech Monopolies are Uniquely Powerful, CNN (Oct. 10, 2020, 8:51 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10
/10/tech/apple-amazon-facebook-amazon-monopoly-data/index.html
[https://perma.cc/A7RYFQZC].
2. See, e.g., Ali M. Al-Khouri, Data Ownership: Who Owns ‘My Data’?, 2 INT’L J. MGMT.
& INFO. TECH. 1, 4 (2012).
3. See id. at 4–5.
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hamburgers, listen to Taylor Swift, and elected Donald Trump as president.
For better or worse, all of these things we do, say, and like become who we
are. Collectively, they identify us as a society and form the basis of how we
conceive of ourselves, how other societies see us today, and how historians
will view us in the future.
Accepting that what we do, say, and like is both economically and culturally valuable, those who develop the tools to gather our collective contributions—phones, applications, search engines—should be rewarded with
some measure of control and compensation. But should that reward be ultimate ownership? Should entities like Google, Facebook, or Amazon be the
arbiters for the contextual demarcation of various categories of “private” data
and its uses? Recognizing that such “ownership” comes with tremendous
responsibility (much of which manifests in contentious litigation or adverse
press), private entities now ask for rational regulation. 4 Unfortunately, even
they have been unable to articulate what could be a rational approach. This
Article suggests that by re-conceptualizing a subset of privacy—what we do,
say, and like—as a public norm rather than individual property, a path to
rational regulation can become clear.
What would a regulatory scheme look like if we re-characterized what
we say, do and like as a collective norm rather than as an individual’s property? While those who salvage this data obviously deserve compensation,
nothing suggests such compensation should be exclusive control. Instead,
not only should collective norms govern the scope of any compensation, but
collective norms should be the stewards of this collective asset, demarcating
what is public from what is private, and determining the uses of that which
is deemed public. This determination would be similar to that made by regulatory entities like the Federal Communications Commission. Common
sense suggests that a public agency accountable to the people is better positioned to identify the contextual norm for the demarcation of social versus
private data.
To support this premise, this Article first defines the precise types of
privacy, data, and information that it is concerned with, including so-called
“Big Data.” Parts III and IV discuss the legal and economic history of
4. The corporations who have most benefited from access to digital data in the form of what
consumers do, say, and like no longer want the burden of authority over the data they purportedly
now own. They have called for some yet-to-be-defined rational regulation, while rejecting the
existing schemes, which they view as undermining the economic and social value of being able to
know what we say, do, and like. Mike Isaac, Mark Zuckerberg’s Call to Regulate Facebook, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/technology/markzuckerberg-facebook-regulation-explained.html [https://perma.cc/3LBX-PVY7].

SCHAEFFER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

256

5/16/2021 11:29 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:3

protecting a demarcation between “private” and “public” in the United
States, including how initial efforts to protect privacy in the digital age and
various protection schemes were influenced by historic notions of privacy in
particular societies. Part V traces the proliferation of digital data collection
and the economic value of what we do, say, and like. Part VI discusses the
many pitfalls of an individualist approach to privacy regulation. Parts VII
and VIII propose an alternative formulation of privacy, including characterizing certain personal information as a public good or as a common. Finally,
Part IX suggests the broad strokes of a regulatory scheme that might better
serve all interested parties when privacy is viewed as a collective norm.
With this foundation, we can begin to formulate and propose a regulatory scheme that can maximize the social, cultural, and economic value of
what we do, say, and like that is consistent with prevailing norms. By reconceptualizing what we do, say, and like as a public norm to which we all
contribute, we can build a better mechanism for establishing a contextual
public/private demarcation that maximizes the social and economic value of
our contribution while affirming the notion that there are things we simply
do not want shared publicly.

II. DEFINING TERMS AND SCOPE: PRIVACY, DATA, AND
INFORMATION
Parameters around three terms will drive this analysis: privacy, data,
and information. Privacy will be discussed first, with data and information
to follow. This section then concludes by considering the value of and myths
surrounding large and dynamic collections of information known as “Big
Data.”

A. The Privacy We Are Concerned with Here
“Privacy remains operationally a ‘fuzzy concept’: there is no broad
consensus on what exactly privacy is, and consequently on what a right to
privacy should protect.” 5 The German philosopher Jurgen Habermas’s
model for modern society is helpful. It demarcates our “lifeworld” as being
“made up of the private sphere (family, private households, intimacy) and
the public sphere (communicative networks that enable private persons to
take part in culture and the formation of public opinion).” 6 This idea builds
5. Lanah Kammourieh et al., Group Privacy in the Age of Big Data, in GROUP PRIVACY:
NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES 37, 44 (Linnet Taylor et. al. eds., 2017).
6. Christian Fuchs, Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, 9 J. INFO., COMM., &
ETHICS SOCIETY 220, 221 (2011). “In the words of Vita Activa, ‘a life spent entirely in public, in
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on Kant’s explanation of his Enlightenment philosophy, which affords the
individual a free space for thought, but expects that such thought will be
contributed to society for its betterment. 7
The U.S. has historically emphasized protecting the individual’s free
space, defining privacy as a negative right: the right to exclude. 8 The European formulation, the right to dignity, is a positive right, focusing on what
the individual chooses to present or contribute to society, i.e., how they
choose to take part in the culture and formation of public opinion. 9 These
distinct formulations address different privacy problems of equal importance
on both sides of the Atlantic. On one side are data security experts responsible for privacy-enhancing technologies. They focus on data processing and
use. They are particularly sensitive to securing data from unknown third
parties, an approach commonly referred to as “institutional privacy.” 10 On
the other side are those concerned with harm experienced when “technologically mediated communications disrupt social boundaries,” referred to as
social privacy. 11 Stated more simply, the focus is on when technology captures what we do, say, or like in both our private sphere and our social sphere.
The focus of this Article is on social privacy.
the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow.’” Ugo Pagallo, The Group, the Private,
and the Individual: A New Level of Data Protection?, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF
DATA TECHNOLOGIES 159, 164 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017).
7. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 230. “Privacy is in modern
societies an ideal rooted in the Enlightenment. The rise of capitalism resulted in the idea that the
private sphere should be separated from the public sphere and not accessible for the public and that
therefore autonomy and anonymity of the individual is needed in the private sphere. The rise of
the idea of privacy in modern society is connected to the rise of the central ideal of the freedom of
private ownership. Private ownership is the idea that humans have the right to own as much wealth
as they want, as long as it is inherited or acquired through individual achievements.” Id.
8. Linnet Taylor et. al, Introduction: A New Perspective on Privacy, in GROUP PRIVACY:
NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES 1, 10 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017). “[T]he right
to privacy is primarily conceived as a negative right, which protects a person’s right to be let alone,
while personality rights also include a person’s right to represent themselves in a public context
and develop their identity and personality.”
9. Yola Georgiadou et al., Location Privacy in the Wake of the GDPR, 8 ISPRS INT’L. J.
GEO-INFO. 157, 2 (2019) (“We distinguish between privacy as a negative right (freedom from interference) and privacy as a positive right (freedom to control)”).
10. Ralf De Wolf et al., Self-Reflection on Privacy Research in Social Networking Sites, 36
BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 459, 2 (2016).
11. Id.
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The controversies and difficulties social privacy presents arise not from
the acknowledgement that a demarcation between private and social exists,
but instead the characterization of what fits within each category, and at what
point the individual should lose any privacy claim to what reaches the public
sphere. While Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google and Alphabet, notoriously once told an interviewer: “If you have something that you don’t
want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place,” 12
accepted norms do extend legitimate claims of privacy well into the public
sphere. 13 To be clear, our interest here is not with the protection against the
invasion of private matter such as the thoughts or intimacies shared only
within the closest social relationships like families or romantic partnerships,
but instead our right to control the elements of our identity that make us social beings (generally, what we do, say, and like). This type of privacy “may
aptly be described not only as contextually appropriate information flow, but
also as governance of personal information.” 14
Interest in privacy has existed now for well over 250 years. 15 What has
changed is that we can now retain activity/data that was once lost or inaccessible due to the inability to collect, store, and retrieve the information in an
efficient manner in an analog world. 16 While this change is fundamental, it
is foolhardy to consider privacy anew. We cannot expect to view this new
paradigm free from the bias of our past. In fact, anti-skepticism is the rational explanation for why both the United States and Europe cling to notions
of privacy as an individual right, adequately addressed by informed consent,
despite overwhelming evidence that this approach is unworkable. 17
12. Haydar Jasem Mohammad, Google or Privacy, the Inevitable Trade-Off 12 (Sept. 2019)
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Arctic University of Norway) (on file with Arctic University of Norway) (quoting CNBC, Google CEO Eric Schmidt on Privacy, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2009), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6e7wfDHzew [https://perma.cc/FCZ9-9J9C]).
13. Benedict Rumbold & James Wilson, Privacy Rights and Public Information, 27 J. POL.
PHIL. 3, 5 (2019) (“Even in public, norms governing . . . the ‘appropriate flow of personal information’ can still render certain activities violations of individuals’ right to privacy.”).
14. Madelyn Rose Sanfilippo et. al., Governing Privacy in Knowledge Commons (forthcoming Mar. 2021) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors).
15. See Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 230 (“Privacy is in
modern societies an ideal rooted in the Enlightenment.”).
16. See generally Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 56.
17. ANNIKA RICHTERICH, THE BIG DATA AGENDA: DATA ETHICS AND CRITICAL DATA
STUDIES 25 (2018) (Anti-scepticism “refers to the anti-Cartesian foundation of pragmatism: ‘We
have no alternative to beginning with the ‘prejudices’ that we possess when we begin doing
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Consistent with the Coase Theorem, 18 we must “start our analysis with a situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine the effects of a
proposed policy change and to attempt to decide whether the new situation
would be, in total, better or worse than the original one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have some relevance to the actual situation.” 19 It is
simply wrong to conclude that strengthening privacy can do no harm. 20
The analysis of social privacy is both economic and ethical. 21 Decisions about privacy are ethical in the pragmatic sense in that norms and values are being negotiated. 22 The level of concern over privacy varies widely
with some seeking strong privacy regardless of the cost and others who are
far less concerned. 23 Neither can be shown to be more objectively correct.
There is no “right” answer. Rather, it is a process of negotiation and

philosophy . . . The prejudices ‘are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned . . . Cartesian doubt ‘will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt’”); see Christopher Hookway, American Pragmatism: Fallibilism and Cognitive Progress, in EPISTEMOLOGY: THE KEY THINKERS
153, 155 (Stephen Hetherington ed., Continuum 1st ed. 2012).
18. Coase Theorem is a legal and economic theory developed by economist Ronald Coase
that affirms that where there are complete competitive markets with no transaction costs, an efficient set of inputs and outputs to and from production-optimal distribution will be selected, regardless of how property rights are divided. Thayer Watkins, Illustration of the Coase Theorem, SAN
JOSÉ ST. U. DEP’T OF ECON., https://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/coasetheorem.htm [https://
perma.cc/BY2B-QZXA].
19. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960).
20. While “it is a typical American liberal belief that strengthening privacy can cause no
harm[,] . . . privacy can undermine common goods (public safety, public health). That privacy is
not automatically a positive value has also been reflected in criticism of privacy. Critics of the
privacy concept argue that it promotes an individual agenda and possessive individualism that can
harm the public/common good.” Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 224.
21. The economics of privacy will be explored more below in the discussion on data. See
discussion infra Part IV.
22. Richterich, supra note 17, at 4 (“Within a pragmatist framework, something is ethical
because values and morals are being negotiated.”).
23. “Some wish to share more about themselves, and some less.” Dennis D. Hirsch, Privacy, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons: A Response to Professors Fairfield
and Engel, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67, 67 (2016); Alessandro Acquisti et. al, The Economics of
Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 442, 446 (2016) (“[P]rivacy sensitivities and attitudes are subjective and idiosyncratic, because what constitutes sensitive information differs across individuals.”).
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renegotiation. 24 To paraphrase Slavoj Zizek, since we will not find the right
approach, we must strive towards the least wrong approach. 25
What informs this analysis is how we view our human relations in our
society. Based on fieldwork performed in the 1950s, the social anthropologist Mary Douglas theorized four cultural poles—egalitarianism, hierarchy,
individualism, and fatalism—with all cultures having some balance of all
four. 26 How each approaches justice helps to elucidate their meaning: egalitarianism views justice as a just outcome for all; hierarchy views it as a
rights-based process; to an individualist, it means “to each his due;” and a
fatalist views justice as whatever power dictates. 27
As noted above, the United States takes an individualist approach to
privacy, allowing each individual to transact their privacy like a commodity
but requiring informed consent. Europe’s individualist approach is more hierarchical, requiring individuals to affirmatively opt into the collection of
their data. A privacy fatalist sees no point in regulating personal information
because any scheme will be breached. A privacy egalitarian, by contrast,
considers the social: what policy is fair to all members of a society regardless
of their technical sophistication. 28 While cultures with an individualist bent
have a transactional view of privacy, an egalitarian culture would view what
its members do, think, and say as part of the collective culture. A way to
distinguish between an individualist approach and an egalitarian approach
can be described “by the rallying cries ‘my data belong to me, and I can use
it for whatever purpose’ vs. ‘privacy is a human right, and its protection is in
the public interest.’” 29

24. Richterich, supra note 17, at 25 (Anti-foundationalism “between more or less reliable
and well-grounded knowledge: in this sense, knowledge is not seen as universal and beyond eventual revision, but may be subject to reconsideration in light of future discoveries or developments.”).
25. SLAVOJ ZIZEK, ABSOLUTE RECOIL: TOWARDS A NEW FOUNDATION OF DIALECTICAL
MATERIALISM (reprt. 2015) (2014).
26. Georgiadou et al., supra note 9, at 10.
27. Id. at 10–11.
28. Id. at 10.
29. De Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 3.
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Privacy, in all instances, is a relative right and not an absolute right. 30
This can be seen in Europe’s codification of its right to privacy—“the right
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”—
as set forth in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR”), which expressly recognizes that privacy can be limited “in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 31 While
like the United States’ more narrowly drawn Fourth Amendment rights, Article 8 of the ECHR is expressly limited to actions by the state, the jurisprudence surrounding both suggests a shared contemporary public norm that
one’s right to privacy must be balanced with “security,” “economic wellbeing of the country,” and “protection of health or morals.” 32 One should not,
however, view this as a duality, as in the more privacy is protected, the more
these more social values are compromised. Rather, each value represents
different interests that any law or regulation should seek to optimize. 33 In
other words, more privacy does not necessarily mean less security, and vice
versa. 34 Similarly, Big Tech criticizes individualized informed consent regimes and, in particular, more onerous opt-in formulations, for failing to adequately consider their macro-economic harm in terms of lost efficiencies.
While Big Tech has indicated a willingness to be regulated, in order to avoid
the hammer these regulations impose on missteps, it has yet to find an acceptable balance within an individualized approach. 35 If a balance between

30. Pagallo, supra note 6, at 209.
31. Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to Respect for
Private and Family Life, Home and Correspondence 7, 11 (2020) (Council of Eur: Eur. Ct. H.R.)
https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_8_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAM5-WE9V].
32. Id. at 11.
33. “Antidualism stresses the need to refrain from predefined, taken-for-granted dichotomies.” Richterich, supra note 17, at 25.
34. “The tension is sometimes presented as being asymmetric: between the ethics of privacy and the politics of security. In fact, it is ultimately ethical. Two moral duties need to be
reconciled proactively: fostering human rights and improving human welfare.” Luciano Floridi,
Group Privacy: A Defence and an Interpretation, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA
TECHNOLOGIES 83, 84 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds., 2017).
35. See Isaac, supra note 4.
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competing norms is not achievable within the informed consent structure,
maybe it is time to consider other paradigms.
Privacy is also contextual. 36 Most people would reasonably agree that
what they tell their doctor is meaningfully different than what they post on
Facebook. This difference, however, does not mean that individuals have no
privacy interest whatsoever in what they post on Facebook. More rationally,
it means that what works for one will not necessarily work for the other.
“Contextual privacy is ‘preserved when informational norms are respected
and violated when informational norms are breached . . . . [W]hether or not
control is appropriate depends on the context, the types of information, the
subject, sender, and recipient.’” 37 Helen Nissenbaum, who receives much of
the credit for exploring this subject, is recognized for making four key
claims: “(1) privacy is appropriate flow of personal information; (2) flows
conform with entrenched contextual informational norms; (3) contextual informational (privacy) norms refer to five independent parameters (subjects,
senders, recipients, information types, and transmission principles); and (4)
privacy is respected when an action conforms to legitimate, social and individual, norms.” 38
Significantly, the United States’ approach to privacy has been contextual in that it developed in a sector-specific manner. “Laws such as the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 and
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 cover data uses in narrow
contexts, such as health and financial information respectively.” 39 For instance, credit reporting is currently one of the most highly regulated sectors
in the United States, tracing its lineage at the federal level to the Fair Credit
Report Act of 1970 (FCRA). 40 Such legislation precludes financial
36. From an economic perspective, “[t]he value of keeping some personal information protected and the value of it being known are almost entirely context-dependent and contingent on
essentially uncertain combinations of states of the world.” Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 446.
From a social view, “the right to privacy is properly understood as a right to ‘contextual integrity’
and what this amounts to ‘varies from context to context.’” Rumbold, supra note 13, at 5.
37. Christian Fuchs, The Political Economy of Privacy on Facebook, 13 TELEVISION &
NEW MEDIA 139, 142 (2012).
38. Sanfilippo et. al., supra note 14 (manuscript at 20).
39. MICHELLE DE MOOY, RETHINKING PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT AND DATA
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY REGIMES IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION 11 (2017).
40. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 471.
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institutions from discrimination based on personal attributes such as racial,
ethnic, or other protected characteristics. However, “[t]echnological advancements have made [it] possible [now] for lending companies to mine
online and offline data and make offers only to populations with credit attractiveness.” 41 The disparate, sector-specific approach may be a boon for
lawyers and consultants who have mastered the myriad of overlapping state
and federal sector-specific approaches. As the availability of diverse data
from diverse sources continues to expand, however, this sector-specific approach will become unmanageable in the absence of an omnibus solution
under the auspices of a single authority well versed in privacy’s contextual
nature.
Finally, before considering what data/information is private, one must
acknowledge the relational aspect to social privacy. “When two people—
let’s call them Alice and Bob—interact, and Alice learns something about
Bob in the process, Bob may place his faith in Alice that she will not communicate these details to others. Bob’s privacy depends, in part, on Alice’s
behavior: here, her willingness to abstain from speaking about their interactions.” 42 Similarly, when Alice posts a picture of herself that captures Bob,
she is disclosing information about Bob. Moreover, the mere fact that Bob
associates with Alice discloses information about Bob. Thus, trust in some
notion of privacy between Bob and Alice with respect to the information they
share with each other, is undermined if they share that information across
any sort of social network, including email, or simply in a public place.
“[R]elational privacy recognizes that different privacy expectations attach to
different people and institutions in our lives and suggests that law should
take into account these different sensitivities in setting rules about such expectations (for example, by recognizing that we may have a greater interest
in privacy against the government than we do against our neighbors).” 43 As
will be developed below, it is largely this relational aspect to privacy that
makes the current individualist approach based on informed consent so illconceived.

41. Nir Kshetri, Big Data’s Impact on Privacy, Security and Consumer Welfare, 38
TELECOMMS. POL’Y 1134, 1148 (2014).
42. Solon Barocas & Karen Levy, Privacy Dependencies, 95 WASH. L. REV. 555, 556
(2020).
43. Id. at 560; Karen Levy et al., Regulating Privacy in Public/Private Space: The Case of
Nursing Home Monitoring Laws, 26 ELDER L.J. 323, 327–29 (2019).
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B. Data and Information
When we move away from privacy as a demarcation, the question becomes: What is it precisely that we want to keep private? Whether personal
thoughts, credit card numbers, information about one’s body, or simply personal information that one wishes to control with respect to one’s social self,
these are all things that can be expressed in words. As intangibles, each is
distinct from our norm of protecting physical property as private, which we
view as having its own unique economic value to our society in and of itself.
To illustrate, there is a distinction between the value of my car, which has
value independent of its connection to me, and my bank account number,
which is a set of numbers with no value absent its connection to me. Unfortunately, this distinction is inevitably blurred by concepts like “intellectual
property,” which extends the protections we afford physical matter to things
that exist in words or ideas. For example, trade dress protection is not concerned with the physical packaging itself, but with the inanimate attributes a
configuration has in the minds of consumers. In the same way, copyright is
not concerned with the physical manifestation of a creative endeavor,
whether captured in a book, a painting or a sculpture, but the inanimate expression itself. 44 Put simply, if you steal a physical book or work of art, you
have not committed copyright infringement.
Contemporary nomenclature conceives of “data” as that which can be
expressed in words as opposed to physical matter. 45 Currently, data “refers
to discrete, objective facts or observations about a person, event or situation
that is unorganized, unprocessed and without specific meaning.” 46 While
44. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 US 339, 347 (1908) (“‘The copyright is an exclusive
right to the multiplication of the copies, for the benefit of the author or his assigns, disconnected
from the plate, or any other physical existence. It is an incorporeal right to print and publish the
map’” (quoting Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. 528, 530 (1852)).
45. Curiously, “data” derives from the Latin plural of datum, meaning “that is given,”
which seems to relate only to certain readily apparent information, such as one’s age, location, and
race. This definition ignores what we do, say, and like; better characterized as our “achievements,”
which would be sublata in Latin. While we will discuss later how best to characterize data, some
may suggest that “what is given” about ourselves (in other words, our attributes) are distinguishing
characteristics like what the qualities that differentiate one piece of property from another. Such
attributes, however, are aspects of personhood, which most societies distinguish from property in
that one cannot sell oneself into slavery and most societies consider prostitution to be a crime.
Richterich, supra note 17, at 4; Lauren Henry Scholz, Big Data is Not Big Oil: The Role of Analogy
in the Law of New Technologies, 86 TENN. L. REV. 863, 880 (2020).
46. Arjuna Dibley & Rachelle Cole, Big Value from Big Data? Recognizing Public Value
from Public Data in the Innovation Economy, DIG. CITIZEN CONF., U. OF MELBOURNE 5 (2019).
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data by itself has some value, its true value comes from its relation to other
data, which is information. For example, the number of questions a student
answers correctly on a test is data, but that piece of data only has meaning,
or provides information, when compared to the performance of others on the
same test. 47
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) defines personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person.” 48 Personal data can come in three forms: volunteered, that which
one freely gives; observed; and inferred, that which is derived from relations
with other data. 49 Such data can be spatial—including information from
which a location can be determined—or not. 50 While securing raw data such
as medical records and credit card numbers—the principal focus of institutional privacy—is no doubt valuable, it is clearly no longer sufficient to address all normative privacy concerns, as the passage of the GDPR demonstrates. 51
Data, and the information derived therefrom, has always been of keen
interest to governments, social scientists, economists, and those in the private
sector. 52 Until recently, however, personal data has been a relatively scarce
good “and [its] compilation was subject to controlled collection and deliberate analytical processes.” 53 While the film The Lives of Others shows the
great lengths the East German Stasi went to collect information on its citizens, 54 today only trust protects societies from becoming police states. 55
47. Id. at 5–6.
48. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 (EU).
49. Georgiadou et. al., supra note 9, at 7.
50. Id.
51. Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 65.
52. “The history of the modern state, and the history of data are deeply intertwined. Data
was, and remains, an important tool for the state to understand the public over which it has governing power, and for exercising that power.” Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at 2.
53. Richterich, supra note 17, at 4 (citing ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG
DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2014)).
54. DAS LEBEN DER ANDEREN (Wiedemann & Berg et al. 2006).
55. “As Richard Clark (2014), a former presidential cyber security advisor and one of the
authors of the American government’s report reviewing the data collection and monitoring capabilities at the NSA, stated, ‘we have created the potential of a police surveillance state.’” Quirine
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What has changed is that what was once lost—essentially all personal
data that members of past societies did not knowingly provide—is now relatively easy to collect, retain, and analyze. There are at least five steps to
this complete “datafication” 56 of personal information: (1) digital data stored
on networked computers; (2) consumer adoption of the internet; (3) the proliferation of smart phones; (4) the adoption of networked biometric sensors;
and (5) the “internet of things,” which includes home listening devices such
as Amazon’s Alexa or Ring, Apple’s Home Pod, and Google’s Home and
Nest. “The spread of mobile computing and sensor technologies has blurred
the distinctions between digital and physical, online and offline. All of this
has led to services that simultaneously generate and capture digital trails of
personal and professional activities—activities that were previously conducted in private and left little or no trace.” 57
This advance is viewed positively not only by techno adepts, “but also
amongst scholars who see datafication as a revolutionary research opportunity to investigate human conduct.” 58 “Traditionally, gathering population
data has involved surveys conducted on the individual level with people who
knew they were offering up personal information to the government. The
census[, for example,] is carefully guarded by the public authorities, and misuse of its data is trackable and punishable.” 59 Today, vast amounts of personal data, far beyond anything conceivable prior to the internet, is gathered,
processed, and controlled by private corporations with still immature forms
of public oversight. 60

Eijkman, Indiscriminate Bulk Data Interception and Group Privacy: Do Human Rights Organisations Retaliate Through Strategic Litigation?, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA
TECHNOLOGIES 151, 155 (Linnet Taylor et al. eds. 2017).
56. “Datafication refers to the quantification of social interactions and their transformation
into digital data.” Richterich, supra note 17, at 1.
57. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 444.
58. José van Dijck, Datafication, Dataism and Dataveillance: Big Data Between Scientific
Paradigm and Ideology, 12 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 197, 198 (2014).
59. Linnet Taylor, Safety in Numbers? Group Privacy and Big Data Analytics in the Developing World, in GROUP PRIVACY: NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES 24, 24 (Linnet
Taylor et al. eds. 2017).
60. “Today’s social media, search engines and the internet of things produce more data in
only a brief period of time than were previously generated in all of human history.” De Mooy,
supra note 39, at 4.
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C. The Value of Big Data and Its Limitations
“Big Data” refers not only to the collection of this data, but also its
processing. Big Data has long been defined as “‘high-volume, high-velocity
and high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative
forms of information processing for enhanced insight and decision making.’” 61
Big Data is less concerned with the linkage of data with an identified
individual, in the way institutional privacy is, e.g., securing the tie of a particular individual to a particular medical or financial record. Instead, Big
Data is concerned with connecting traits and finding patterns. “By combining structured and unstructured data from multiple sources, firms can uncover hidden connections between seemingly unrelated pieces of data.” 62
Simply put: “users of big data may not care about Alice at all, but only about
the fact whether Alice, whoever she is, belongs to the group that regularly
goes to the local church, or mosque, or synagogue, uses Grindr, or has gone
to a hospital licensed to carry out abortions, or indeed shares [some other]
feature of your choice.” 63
Through the use of particular algorithms, commonly referred to as Artificial Intelligence (AI) or machine learning, vast amounts of data are processed through computers to train the computers to identify patterns and
links between data known about one person with another. “By extracting
subsets from individual-level information or classes of similar individuals
based on common habits and characteristics, technology can itself discover
or “create” groups that may have consequences for members.” 64 To illustrate, “Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) is a crime-prediction
program developed by the Department of Homeland Security.” “The purpose of the program is to ‘rapidly identify suspicious behavior indicators to
provide real-time decision support to security and law enforcement personnel’” by linking currently observed activity of a person or group with historic
61. Kshetri, supra note 41, at 1134 (quoting Definition of Big Data, GARTNER INFO. TECH.
GLOSSARY,
https://www.gartner.com/en/information-technology/glossary/big-data
[https://
perma.cc/NAU5-CPTF]).
62. Id. at 1146.
63. Jennifer Jiyoung Suh et al., Distinguishing Group Privacy From Personal Privacy: The
Effect of Group Inference Technologies on Privacy Perceptions and Behaviors, 2 PROC. OF THE
ACM ON HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 1, 2 (2018).
64. Id. at 3.
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data of other persons or groups. 65 Given that the value of Big Data comes
from its ability to identify patterns and link traits to groups, to claim that
security and privacy are protected simply by anonymizing that data seems
rather shallow. 66
One significant limitation of Big Data—among others—is that it is not
neutral because not all members of a society contribute to the same extent.
Data sets will be biased in favor of those less concerned about privacy who
“have the necessary resources, plus the skills and an interest, to use certain
digital devices and platforms. Although collected in immense quantities,
[B]ig [D]ata may still represent [only] specific populations.” 67 Big Data fails
to capture both technologically sophisticated individuals who actively avoid
contributing data, but also those who lack the means or skills to actively participate online. For example, Apple released its Research Kit in 2015, which
it touted “as an efficient, effective possibility for recruiting study participants
and collecting data.” 68 This collection, however, is limited to Apple users
who are already known to be a distinct demographic group, so much so that
some online retailers know that they are typically willing to pay more for a
service. 69
The flaws of Big Data should not lead to the conclusion that we can
ignore the economic or social harm in implementing legislation that undermines its value in the name of privacy. We must acknowledge that our existing preference for notice and consent schemes in the name of privacy protection can undermine the social and economic value of this data. To some,
the fully informed consumer would share the views of strong privacy
65. Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christopher Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J.
385, 405 (2015) (quoting DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 2 (2008), https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE3H-3CFE]).
66. With Big Data “the particular and the individual is no longer central . . . . Data is analysed on the basis of patterns and group profiles; the results are often used for general policies and
applied on a large scale. The fact that the individual is no longer central, but incidental to these
types of processes, challenges the very foundations of most currently existing legal, ethical and
social practices and theories.” Taylor et. al, supra note 8, at 13–14.
67. Richterich, supra note 17, at 46.
68. Id.
69. Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23,
2012,
6:07
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882 [https://perma.cc/EP4F-CWAW].
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advocates and rationally decide that neither private corporations nor the government should know what they say, do, or like, beyond that which they explicitly direct towards those entities. If consumers were capable of comprehending the notices they receive, they would opt out of most data collection,
destroying the value of Big Data.
Big Tech’s concern with respect to the GDPR opt-in approach to consent is the belief that most consumers are relatively passive and if given the
choice, they would prefer not to check a box regardless of its purpose. If too
many were to decline to participate and refuse to contribute what they say,
like, and do to Big Data, we would then return to the analog world of the last
century (and likely suffer an economic recession due to the loss of efficiencies that Big Data has delivered). 70 This is surely not the case for those who
subscribe to the belief that what Big Data has delivered is an illusion, but
most would agree that Netflix knows better what we want to watch than the
historic Nielsen system. 71 Many may not lament the destruction of Big Tech
companies (those that exist because of Big Data) that a competent notice and
choice system would likely cause, but if one agrees that knowing what we
collectively say, do, and like has a macro economic and social value, a legislative scheme that “sticks it to Big Tech” becomes a societal self-inflicted
wound.
By the same token, if there is societal value to data collected, societies
are logically paying too much to its collectors by ceding the data collected
to them as the collector’s property alone. While a compelling argument can
be made that the insights collectors or other users gain from the data collected own their insights, the data itself is society’s and not the collector’s
property alone. The data is a collection of our shared activity, communication, and preferences.

70. Yan Carrière-Swallow and Vikram Haksar. The Economics and Implications of Data
An Integrated Perspective, No. 10/16 INT. MONETARY FUND 1, 29 (2019) (“[A] push to tighten
privacy regulations may be effective at protecting consumer rights but may generate unforeseen
harm to efficiency and competition”).
71. Timothy Havens, Media Programming in an Era of Big Data, 1.2 MEDIA INDUSTRIES
J. 5, 7 (2014) (“The Netflix prize was built around improving what’s known as a “collaborative
filtering” algorithm, which uses such things as viewer ratings, history, and behavior to recommend
content that already exists on the service.” (emphasis in original)).
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III. THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED
STATES: A LEGAL REGIME FOUNDED IN INDIVIDUALISM
The prevailing attitudes towards privacy in Western societies—and the
legal regimes derived therefrom—have their roots in the Enlightenment. 72
This is when philosophers challenged the public to emerge from immaturity
and to rely on one’s own understanding without the guidance of others. 73
Freedom was a prerequisite to achieving this goal, as men must be able to
think freely, while still behaving obediently in civil society. 74 Such freethinking men were not only “completely free” to pursue their thoughts, but
were also “obliged to impart to the public all [their] carefully considered,
well-intentioned thoughts.” 75 This idea of personality separate and apart
from society is a uniquely Western European one. 76
Self-determination as championed by Enlightenment thinkers is the
foundation of both America’s Declaration of Independence and the French
Revolution. 77 The focus of both historical efforts was to protect individuals
from the State. Surprisingly, however, the word privacy appears nowhere in
the U.S. Constitution. At best, the Fourth Amendment, adopted with this
Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights, established a threshold for state
72. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 230.
73. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”, (Sept. 30,
1784), https://web.cn.edu/kwheeler/documents/What_is_Enlightenment.pdf [https://perma.cc
/38T9-PMCB]. It is important to recall that these societies believed that such “enlightenment”
would be pursued only by a privileged few since “[l]aziness and cowardice are the reasons why
such a large proportion of men, even when nature has long emancipated them from alien guidance
(naturaliter maiorennes), nevertheless gladly remain immature for life.” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. It contrasts sharply, for example, with “Ubuntu, the famed African egalitarian culture,
whose core definition is ‘people are people through other people’ [which] leaves little room for
personal privacy.” Georgiadou et al., supra note 9, at 13. Similarly, while China affords some
protections for workers and consumers collectively from misuse of their data by companies,
“[t]here are no comprehensive legal principles that protect privacy interests nor any effective definition of privacy exist in China and the general population of China have no knowledge of the
concept of privacy.” Mohammad, supra note 12, at 12–13 (citing Hao Wang, PROTECTING
PRIVACY IN CHINA: A RESEARCH ON CHINA’S PRIVACY STANDARDS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE INFORMATION PRIVACY PROTECTION
LEGISLATION IN MODERN CHINA (2011)).
77. Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 54.
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interference with private property. Its guarantee of an individual’s right to
private property free from interference is a foundational notion of liberty as
defined in the U.S.
The connection between privacy and property was necessary for the
nascent democracies founded in the late 18th century with capitalist economies to solidify and thrive. John Stuart Mill would later write about the value
of private property to a successful economy. Specifically, “the right of each
to his (or her) own faculties, to what he can produce by them, and to whatever
he can get for them in a fair market: together with his right to give this to any
other person if he chooses.” 78 To Mill, privacy:
[I]s a circle around every individual human being, which no
government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to
be permitted to overstep: there is a part of the life of every person
who has come to years of discretion, within which the
individuality of that person ought to reign uncontrolled either by
any other individual or by the public collectively. 79
Much of our current thought about a right to privacy beyond personal property can be traced back to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 article 80 written in response to the increasing intrusiveness of technology and
the media. The authors recount how “[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic
life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction
that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the housetops.’” 81 They found protecting individuals against invasion of their personal realm a “right of the individual to be let alone,” which they labeled as
a “‘right to privacy’—the invasion of which [amounted to] a tort.” 82

78. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 200 (D. Appleton and Company ed. 1885).
79. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 223.
80. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
81. Id. at 195.
82. Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can
Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2006).
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Justice Brandeis would later expand on this idea, which he considered
inherent in our jurisprudence, finding a constitutional foundation to the right
to be left alone in the Fourth Amendment. In his view, this right not only
prohibits physical trespass on one’s private property, but more generally,
protected against the “unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the
privacy of the individual.” 83 According to Brandeis, “[t]he makers of our
Constitution . . . . conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” 84
Recently, a sharply divided Supreme Court reaffirmed Justice
Brandeis’s expansive reading by explicitly recognizing that, while Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence was “‘tied to common-law[,]’” 85 “‘property
rights[, such rights] are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.’” 86 The Court recognized that “[w]hen an individual ‘seeks to preserve something as private,’ and his expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,’ [the] . . . official intrusion into
that private sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause.” 87 While the Court reaffirmed that “a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
to third parties,” 88 the mere fact that the information is in the possession of a
third party alone is not determinative. 89 Finally, and relevant to our discussion here, the Court reaffirmed that “[a] person does not surrender all Fourth
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.” 90

83. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012)).
86. Id. (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)).
87. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
88. Id. at 2216 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44).
89. Id. at 2217.
90. Id.
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Outside the realm of the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court
has, since 1965, recognized a constitutional right to privacy. 91 Specifically,
in overturning state regulation of contraception, the Court found within the
First Amendment’s “freedom to associate” a penumbra protecting the “‘privacy in one’s associations.’” 92 Curiously, despite the tremendous focus on
privacy recently, the general public’s consensus that privacy is a shared
norm, and the endless debate about the breadth of its protection under the
federal Constitution, there has been little effort to codify this norm as a constitutional amendment. 93 By contrast, eleven states have explicitly recognized a right to privacy in their constitutions, many of which were enacted
following Griswold v. Connecticut. 94
While both the Fourth Amendment and the penumbra found within our
right of association apply only to state actors, these articulations are evidence
of a shared cultural norm. Bolstered by the foundational norm of private
property, which is the cornerstone of Western capitalist society, this jurisprudence on privacy reflects a shared norm of privacy that reaches all facets
of U.S. society. Significantly, as developed, this right to privacy is a negative right, the right to be left alone. 95 This contrasts with the European norm,
rooted in the devastating experience of World War II, which focuses on protecting human dignity. 96 Both legal schemes, however, take as their focus
the individual, the individual’s property interest in their privacy, and both
consider informed consent to be paramount. 97

91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
92. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
93. One may surmise that this is largely due to this country’s endless abortion debate.
94. See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NCSL (Oct. 6, 2020), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-instate-constitutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/BNJ5-ZJBE]. The people of the State of California
adopted their right to privacy in 1974, which reads, “All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”
CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 1.
95. Taylor et. al, supra note 8, at 10.
96. Georgiadou et al., supra note 9, at 2; ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 40–41
(Ig pub. ed. 2015) (1967).
97. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 412.
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A first articulation of a shared norm of privacy reaching all facets of
the U.S. is found in the Fair Information Principles (“FIPs”), published by
the U.S. Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems in 1973. 98 FIP identifies legal guidelines for personal data compiled on
computer systems. Five principles form its foundation:
1) [T]he existence of personal-data record-keeping systems
should not be kept a secret; 2) people must have a way to find out
what information about themselves is being stored and how it is
being used; 3) people must have a way to prevent information
about them obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for other purposes without their consent; 4) people must
have a way to correct or amend records containing personally
identifiable information; and 5) all organizations creating,
maintaining, using or disseminating personally identifiable data
must assure that the data is reliably being used as intended, and
must take precautions to prevent misuse. 99
The Privacy Act of 1974 was the first body of law to meet these standards. 100
It specifically governed the collection, use, maintenance, and dissemination
of information held by federal agencies. 101 Significantly, despite dramatic
changes in technology following its original adoption, most current U.S. and
European regulatory schemes, including the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) and California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), remain
firmly rooted in FIPs. 102 The primary reason that FIPs fail is that the principles expect “individuals to monitor organizations in order to ensure that their
information is accurate, complete, and used only for the purposes to which
the individual has agreed.” 103
98. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 9 (citing U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, computers,
and the Rights of Citizens viii (1973)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 12.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 12–13.
103. Priscilla M. Regan, Reviving the Public Trustee Concept and Applying It to Information Privacy Policy, 76 MD. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2017).
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In addition to the individualist property approach to privacy that must
have seemed a logical extension of Western society’s preference for private
property, regulatory inaction contributes to our current predicament. Beginning in 1927, the U.S. recognized the need to provide regulatory oversight
over the public airway, which at the time was radio. Specifically, the Federal
Radio Commission (“FRC”) (the predecessor to the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)) was established to ensure that those receiving
broadcast licenses served “the public interest, convenience or necessity.”104
The idea was that:
The public, with the government as its agent, would hand over—
gratis—a license to use its airwaves to operate a radio station for
a fixed period of time. In exchange, the lucky recipient of this
extremely lucrative asset would operate the station as a trustee for
the public that owned its spectrum. 105
Specifically, “the broadcasting privilege will not be a right of selfishness. It
will rest upon an assurance of public interest to be served.” 106 Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934 and replaced the FCR with the FCC,
not only to correct deficiencies, but to broaden public powers over licensee
conduct.” 107
By the 1980s, however, the FCC began to dismantle itself; first under
the Carter administration with respect to radio broadcast, 108 and then under
the Reagan administration with respect to television. 109 The consensus was
that “consumer demand” was a sufficient check to ensure that broadcasters
acted in the public’s interest. Following this deregulation fervor, the Clinton
administration took a hands-off approach to the infant internet. 110 In fact,
104. STEVE WALDMAN, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING
MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND AGE 280 (2011).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 280–81.
108. Id. at 283–84
109. Regan, supra note 103, at 1025.
110. Id.
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rather than simply relying on consumer preference, the administration enacted legislation and passed regulations to shield those playing in this arena
from liability that would otherwise cripple non-digital competitors, be they
broadcasters or retailers. 111 While the internet lacks the spectrum limitations
of terrestrial broadcast media, and, as it developed, did not recognize national
borders, the idea that public preference alone would serve as an adequate
check now seems quaint and plainly naïve.

IV. THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PRIVACY
The progression of economic research on the issue of privacy and its
impact on an economy is also helpful to understand where we are today.
Building on the idea that individuals have a property interest in information
they consider to be private, economists in the 1970s and 1980s began considering the impact of this property interest on the broader economy. Richard Posner, who is both a noted jurist as well as a respected economist, argued “that the protection of privacy creates inefficiencies in the marketplace,
since it conceals potentially relevant information from other economic
agents. For instance, if a job seeker misrepresents her background.” 112
Based on this research, Judge Posner continues to believe that:
[M]uch of what passes for the name of privacy is really just trying
to conceal the disreputable parts of your conduct . . . Privacy is
mainly about trying to improve your social and business
opportunities by concealing the sorts of bad activities that would
cause other people not to want to deal with you. 113
George Stigler, sharing Judge Posner’s view, concluded that regulation in
the market for personal data was destined to be ineffectual “because individuals have an interest in publicly disclosing favorable information and hiding

111. Annemarie Bridy & Daphne Keller, Comment Letter on U.S. Copyright Office’s Second Notice of Inquiry regarding Section 512, at 1 (March 31, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2757197 [https://perma.cc/TKQ2-PBF2].
112. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 450.
113. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 416 (quoting Grant Goss, Judge: Give NSA Unlimited Access to Digital Data, PC WORLD (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:46 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2855776/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-access-todigital-data.html
[http://perma.cc/649V9WTR]).
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negative traits.” 114 Both Posner and Stigler took what we would consider
today to be a very narrow view of privacy.
Similarly, during this time before the advent of the internet and Big
Data, economists also questioned the social value in the acquisition of personal data, finding, at best, “it results in a redistribution of wealth from ignorant to informed agents.” 115 It was recognized, however, that certain forms
of regulation could be socially enhancing. For example, privacy protections
for health information enhance non-distorted disclosures. 116 So prior to the
internet, the most favorable view of the economic value of privacy was
mixed.
Research into the economics of privacy resurged in the 1990s, during
the infancy of the public internet in the matter. 117 In particular, the advent
of new low-cost technologies to collect and manipulate personal information
would likely change the relationship between buyers and sellers. Research
showed that consumers may suffer an economic cost if they chose to share
less rather than more information about themselves online. 118 For this reason, a rational consumer would expect to receive a net benefit from a decision to share personal information even though they would have little understanding or control over how that information would later be used. 119 This
conclusion spawned new markets for personal data. 120 At this time, however,
markets seemed to have difficulty valuing personal data, and an empirical
search began to determine the value of personal data as compared with

114. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 450 (citing George J. Stigler, An Introduction to
Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 623–44 (1980)).
115. Id. (citing Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Incentive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 649–64 (1971)).
116. Id. at 451.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 452 (citing Hal R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in PRIVACY
SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Barbara S. Wellbery ed., 1997), [https://
perma.cc/47LR-8SC4]).

AND

119. Id. at 452.
120. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 452.
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historical analog data. 121 Simply put, it was the comparative value of an
internet eyeball measured by a click compared with an analog eyeball derived from a Nielsen rating or subscription data. It is curious that, during
this time, advertising and subscription-based websites that tried to recreate
the broadcast and cable television model online failed. 122
At this time, economic researchers began to consider the question of
who should hold the economic claim to the personal data collected. 123 While
it was recognized that only regulation could answer this question, economically, its answer would tip the balance between the amount paid for access
against the cost of protection. 124 The economic implications of changes to
the cost of acquisition and the cost of protection remain a fruitful source of
economic research. 125
A third wave of economic research into privacy corresponds with the
dawning of the 21st century as the internet entered its adolescence. Much of
this focus is:
[O]n issues surrounding privacy as the protection of information
about a consumer’s preferences or type (hence a significant
number of models examine the relationships between privacy and
dynamic pricing), different dimensions to privacy (and different
dimensions of informational privacy) exist, and economic trade-

121. Matthew Crain, A Critical Political Economy of Web Advertising History, THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF WEB HISTORY 1, 7–11 (2019).
122. Id.; Evans, David S., The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy, J. ECON. PERSP. FORTHCOMING 1, 5 (2009) (available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=
1376607).
123. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 452 (citing Eli M. Noam, Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION
AGE (1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/1997/privacy-and-self-regulation-information-age
[https://perma.cc/4F47-62QJ]).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Rodrigo Montes et al., The Value of Personal Information in Markets with
Endogenous Privacy (Toulouse Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. 583, 2017), https://www.tsefr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2015/wp_tse_583.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3PNYCR8W].
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offs can arise from different angles of the same privacy
scenarios. 126
At this time, Western economies experienced dramatic shifts. Transactions
and activities that were once private due to the lack of cost-effective means
to capture and compile their analog occurrence, had now moved online. 127
For the first time, economists witnessed the rise of huge corporations financed principally based on their control over both structured and unstructured data.
What drove revenues online was not targeted banner advertising of the
type most akin to advertising on television and in print media, but instead
the ability to target products, content, and price based on personal (and historically private) information about actual or potential consumers. 128 The
digital economy quickly learned that online consumers did not trust what
they considered online advertising, but appreciated what they perceived as
the targeting of products, services, and content they wanted. 129 This discovery is the foundation of the monetization of personal and private data.
Quickly, with this discovery, the economic power of online businesses
funded by personal data surpassed that of businesses supported by traditional
advertising (which only had the ability to target an audience of a particular
demographic). Simply, data captured online had economic value far beyond
ordinary advertising, and the granularity of what was now available digitally
could never have been conceived in our historically analog world. 130 As a
result, companies whose survival turned on outdated forms of advertising are
now clearly in the decline. 131
126. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 454.
127. Id.
128. Crain, supra note 121, at 11–22.
129. See Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 466 (“Goldfarb and Tucker (2011a) find that
obtrusive targeted ads—targeted in the sense that they are matched to the content of a website, and
obtrusive in terms of visibility—are more likely to trigger privacy concerns among users in comparison to obtrusive but not targeted ads, or targeted but less obtrusive ads.” Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Display Advertising: Targeting and Obtrusiveness, 30 MARKETING SCI. 389,
389–404 (2011)).
130. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 17.
131. Evans, supra note 122, at 10 (“[O]nline advertising [is] a more efficient matchmaking
vehicle for advertisers and viewers than offline advertising”).
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V. THE PROLIFERATION OF DIGITAL DATA COLLECTION AND THE
ECONOMIC VALUE OF WHAT WE DO, SAY, AND LIKE
Knowing what societies, or their innumerable subgroups, do, say and
like is incredibly valuable. 132 This value is both microeconomic—providing
intelligence to the businesses that have it—and macroeconomic—promoting
efficiencies to an economy as a whole by being able to deliver to a society
what it wants.
Of all possible economic examples, the historic Nielsen rating system—the audience measurement system developed in the 1950s—is apt.
Television historically presented something of an economic curiosity. 133 After purchasing a television set, consumption was free because the cost of
production was borne by advertisers wanting access to its consumers. Additionally, the industry’s product, a television show, has no objectively intrinsic value in the same way the performance of a BMW and a Hyundai can be
compared. Instead, the value of a network television show is derived solely
from consumer taste. While some would argue that a PBS broadcast of the
Metropolitan Opera has more comparative cultural value, more American
eyes will certainly be glued to the latest broadcast of The Bachelor. This
makes The Bachelor much more economically valuable and likely more relevant to cultural norms in the U.S., whether we like it or not. An efficient
market, therefore, became dependent upon knowing what consumers like. In
the analog world of the 20th century, it was not possible to know what the
hundreds of millions of households in the U.S. were watching at any given
moment. 134 The Nielsen system became a surrogate for this data. It
equipped approximately 10,000 homes throughout the country with a system
that would record the viewing habits of a household and that data was then
extrapolated out to the nation as a whole. 135 Hundreds of millions of advertising dollars were spent annually, predicated—and the fate of countless television shows rested—on what these few households chose to watch.
Until the 21st century, societies lacked other means to comprehensively
collect these contributions and they were left with gross surrogate measures,
132. Id.
133. Shawndra Hill, TV Audience Measurement with Big Data, 2 BIG DATA 76, 76–77
(2014).
134. Id. at 77.
135. Robert Rußell et. al., Monetizing Online Content: Digital Paywall Design and Configuration, BUS. INFO. SYS. ENG. 62, 253–60 (2020).
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such as polling or sales revenues. 136 This changed when computers, interconnected with each other, provided the means for retaining these expressions in the form of digital data. In its infancy, and through its early adolescence, the World Wide Web explored numerous alternatives for
monetization. The first phase was the pay-for-a-portal model of America
Online (AOL), which tried to containerize a user’s entire online experience.
Once access became a commodity, like the cable for your television, the private sector tried subscription models similar to newspapers or magazines.
Consumers, however, equated being online to watching broadcast television,
and were reluctant to pay for content when so much other content remained
free. 137 Seizing upon the broadcast television analogy, online content and
service providers next touted the eyeballs they could deliver to advertisers.
Advertisers were not persuaded that an eyeball on the internet would lead to
sales in the same way they believed eyes and ears connected with sales on
television and radio. Innumerable ad-supported websites and internet marketing companies rose and fell during this tumultuous period.
Today, however, Big Data is touted as “‘the world’s most valuable resource.’” 138 Google contributed to this change. At the time it launched,
Google was merely one of numerous search engines used to navigate the
internet, with Yahoo being the prevailing leader. What distinguished
Google, however, was that it wanted to be nothing more than a search engine.
Google offered a place for search queries, and, at most, changed the graphic
of its name. Google’s simplicity contrasted sharply with its competitors. In
order to be “sticky”—the buzzword of the time—Google’s competitors filled
themselves with loads of other content to hopefully keep users within their
ecosystems. 139 These sites sought to monetize stickiness with untargeted
banner ads to generate revenues. What Google understood, or discovered
through sheer luck, is that most users wanted to be somewhere else and were
looking for the fastest, easiest, and least obnoxious way of getting there. Rather than rely on the banner ads that cluttered other sites, Google sold the

136. Hill, supra note 129, at 77.
137. See Victor Pickard & Alex T. Williams, Salvation or Folly? The Promises and Perils
of Digital Paywalls, 2 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 195, 200, 207 (2014).
138. Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at 3.
139. Mohamed Khalifa et. al., Online Consumer Stickiness: A Longitudinal Study, 60
PACIS 856 (2001).
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right to appear in relevant searches, meaning that users could purchase search
terms (AdWord). 140
As consumers preferred Google’s model, not only did its search engine
gain a competitive advantage, but it started to collect huge amounts of data
about those using its service, linking searching histories to IP addresses and
allowing the company to gain valuable information about those who used its
service. Advertising with Google evolved from simply purchasing key
words to the ability for Google to offer more robust socio-economic and demographic information to advertisers. This resulted in the development of
targeted ads, which were seen as a win-win for consumers and sellers. The
theory behind targeted ads was that “[t]o the extent that people can avoid
seeing ads for things in which they have no interest, and instead see ads for
things they might want to buy, everybody benefits.” 141 “From this perspective, the online economic ecosystem is [seen as] a clear improvement over
the earlier world of mass media, where a lot of advertising expenditure is
wasted, precisely because it can’t be targeted.” 142
This belief in the value of targeted advertising was overwhelmingly
adopted by the private sector, spawning an entire industry around collecting
information about consumers’ perceived wants. 143 Digital ad spending for
2019 in the U.S. alone was $145.3 billion, increasing over 19% from 2018,
and is triple what it was a decade ago. 144 Digital advertising now accounts
for half of all advertising dollars spent in this country, with television in second place at 27.5%. 145 Virtually every connected business, from Facebook
to a local grocery store or gas station, now collects data about their users and
140. See Grow Your Business With Google Ads, GOOGLE ADS (2021), https://
ads.google.com/home/#!/.
141. Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of
Online Consumer Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95, 135 (2019).
142. Id.
143. Fung, supra note 1.
144. US Online Media Spend in 2019 and the Outlook for 2020, MARKETING CHARTS (Feb.
5, 2020), https://www.marketingcharts.com/advertising-trends/spending-and-spenders-111801
[https://perma.cc/F7GS-LCYH]; Bradley Johnson, Internet Media’s Share of U.S. Ad Spending Has
More Than Tripled Over the Past Decade, ADAGE (Dec. 30, 2019), https://adage.com/article/yearend-lists-2019/internet-medias-share-us-ad-spending-has-more-tripled-over-past-decade/2221701
[https://perma.cc/L66D-7BF8].
145. Johnson, supra note 144.
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most both sell and purchase such data from data aggregators. 146 Where historically, television and radio stations could provide you some rudimentary
demographic information about their viewers and listeners, such as age, gender, and likely socio-economic status, content providers like Spotify today
can provide advertisers with granular data based not only on the data they
collect from their listeners, but also from other data aggregators. 147 With this
data, Spotify can design unique and perhaps even previously unrecognized
groups to meet a particular advertiser’s need. 148
The actual value of targeted advertising, however, is suspect. “[V]iewers click on less than 1% of ads displayed, and click-through rates even for
ads on highly targeted services like Facebook and Twitter are in the range of
1 to 3%.” 149 While targeted visual ads on websites that make use of Big Data
are considered to be less obnoxious by consumers than untargeted banner
ads, at least one study suggests these ads only generate twice the revenues
per ad as a wholly untargeted ad. 150 Some cite privacy regulations permit
consumers to opt out of data collection as a reason for the poor sell-through,
arguing that ads are not as targeted as they otherwise could be. They similarly fear that newer opt-in schemes will further erode, if not destroy, the adsupported internet. 151 Research suggests, however, that a more likely reason
for poor sell-through is that “advertisers or data intermediaries—seldom possess socially optimal incentives to match consumers with products.” 152 Aggregators realize that providing imperfect or incomplete data maximizes
their ultimate returns. Despite concerns about low success rate, regardless
146. Kirsten Martin, Data Aggregators, Consumer Data, and Responsibility Online: Who
is Tracking Consumers Online and Should They Stop?, 32 INFO. SOC’Y 1, 51–63 (2016).
147. Matteo Poletti, Learning to Target Advertisements at Spotify, KTH ROYAL INS. TECH.
1, 7 (2015).
148. “By extracting subsets from individual-level information or classes of similar individuals based on common habits and characteristics, technology can itself discover or ‘create’ groups
that may have consequences for members.” Suh et al., supra note 63, at 3.
149. Savage, supra note 141, at 105.
150. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 464. For context, Google earns about one third of its
revenues from AdSense, its service for targeting ads on websites, with the remaining two-thirds
coming from search AdWord. Id. at 466.
151. Id. at 456; Savage, supra note 141, at 104–05.
152. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 459.
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of the reason, digital advertising remains viable because of its relative low
cost and sheer scale.
In addition to the ability to target offers to potential consumers through
advertising, Big Data enables the customization of products and the tailoring
of prices to particular consumers. 153
For instance, if the price of a movie/music is outside a consumer’s
affordability range and if the supplier lacks the ability to price
discriminate, the difference between the price the consumer is
willing to pay and the marginal cost of a copy of the movie/music
represents deadweight loss. 154
Knowing a consumer’s purchasing history or being able connect them to a
group whose history is known, enables suppliers to manipulate price to affordability to overcome deadweight losses or to increase prices in order to
recover optimal profits. 155 The economics concerns balance tradeoffs from
protecting or sharing personal data. 156
One thing that is clear is that the balance in any sales transaction has
shifted. It is true that consumers have much more access to price and product
information than they did previously, and are not as geographically constrained in their purchases as they once were. Sellers, however, not only
know a lot more about each consumer individually—even in the case of new
consumers—they also know a lot more than they used to about how people
decide to buy, including their cognitive limitations biases. 157 This suggests
that the actual merits of a product or service play a decreasing role in purchasing decisions. 158
Recent economic research focuses on the impacts of varying privacy
costs on effective price discrimination and the impacts of restrictions on the

153. Montes et al., supra note 125, at 32, 34.
154. Kshetri, supra note 41, at 1145.
155. Id.
156. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 443.
157. Savage, supra note 141, at 142.
158. Id.
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use and availability of data. 159 For example, research shows that “[a] prohibition on the collection, processing or commercial use of data would presumably increase the price of products and services for the consumers, with
uncertain results that this solution would enhance the competition from rival
firms,” i.e., price discrimination based on a customer’s profile is likely economically positive to the economy as a whole. 160 Additionally, it has been
shown that “[p]rice discrimination in the absence of universal transaction
privacy leads to a welfare loss whenever the profiling of consumers is imperfect.” 161 Stated more simply, “due to unavoidable errors in customer profiling, retailers will mistakenly quote high prices to some customers” above
which they are willing to pay and vice versa, resulting in an overall loss of
social welfare. 162 More troubling, however, is the fact that access to more
data than a competitor can entrench monopolies, and data brokers maximize
their economic benefit by not selling the same data to all rivals. 163
While, on balance, Big Data bring efficiencies to the purchase and sale
of products, it is far from the whole story of the economic, social, and cultural value that the collection, storage, and processing of what we say, do,
and like has to a society. The availability of Big Data increases the efficiency
of production processes and provides predictive insights into market
trends. 164 In addition to enhancing economic efficiencies, the societal benefits of collecting and processing large amounts of personal information are
numerous, including advancements in public health, education, welfare, and
security. 165

159. See Montes et al., supra note 125.
160. Andrea Giannaccari, The Big Data Competition Story: Theoretical Approaches and
the First Enforcement Cases 3 (Eur. U. Inst. Dep’t of L., Working Paper No. 10, 2018).
161. Rodney J. Garratt & Maarten R. C. van Oordt, Privacy as a Public Good: A Case for
Electronic Cash 12 (Bank of Can., Staff Working Paper No. 24, 2019).
162. Id. at 32.
163. The data seller’s profits are greater when it sells the full dataset to one firm only rather
than selling an additional imperfect dataset to the other firm competing on the same market. Montes
et al., supra note 125, at 30; Richterich, supra note 17, at 41.
164. Giannaccari, supra note 160, at 4.
165. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 24.
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With the maturation of the digital economy, the collection, access, and
control of Big Data resides with fewer and fewer private entities. 166 This Big
Data divide is evident from the fact that Google, which remains the world’s
most used search engine, is now only the 25th most frequently visited website, and today’s top ten websites account for 62% of all web traffic. 167 Consumers no longer need to search where they might want to go—they already
know where they want to be. Similarly, most commercial websites are now
hosted by Amazon’s Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) and most mobile data
passes through Apple IOS or Google Android. These entities decide how
data is fed into their algorithms that determine the content we subsequently
see. 168 This content is not limited to advertisements, but also information
posts they determine fit with our interests. These commercial websites use
public concern over privacy to eschew efforts to develop methods for datasharing, suggesting that others may not be as careful stewards of our personal
data. 169 They know that:
[C]onsumers are more likely to grant their opt-in consent to large
networks with a broad scope, rather than to less established firms.
Hence, if regulation focuses only on enforcing an opt-in approach,
users may be less likely to try out services from less established
firms and entrants, potentially creating barriers to entry. 170
This lack of data-sharing and roadblocks to nascent competitors’
acquisition of personal data serves to undermine competition and
further entrench their positions. 171

166. “The phrase ‘big data divide’ emphasizes the tensions resulting from asymmetries in
data access. It calls attention to the biased capacities for gaining insights into this material and
assessing its implications. In addition, the term ‘data monopolies’ stresses that this divide not only
characterizes customers’ lack of agency, but the market dominance of very few internet and tech
corporations.” Richterich, supra note 17, at 41.
167. Joshua Hardwick, Top 100 Most Visited Websites by Search Traffic (2021), AHREFS
BLOG, https://ahrefs.com/blog/most-visited-websites/ [https://perma.cc/48L9-MT6J].
168. Richterich, supra note 17, at 1.
169. Id. at 40.
170. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 456.
171. “[F]irms with market power often benefit from committing to privacy policies.” Id.
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In addition to the economic power this data gives those who control Big
Data, their current “ownership” over Big Data enables them to influence scientific research reliant on this data. It is not uncommon for such research to
either be conducted by persons employed by these entities or funded in whole
or in part by them. 172 “The triple role of data collector, service provider and
funding body is a defining feature of internet/tech corporations. It puts these
stakeholders in a powerful position.” 173 Today, these few entities get to “decide which societal actors may have access to data generated via their respective platforms, and define in what ways they are made available.” 174 As
noted in a 2017 report published by the Google Transparency Project, between 2005 and 2017, 329 research papers dealing with public policy issues
in the interest of Google were funded by the corporation. 175 Similarly,
“[o]nly Facebook has the data that can exactly reveal how fake news, hoaxes
and misinformation spread, how much there is of it, who creates and who
reads it, and how much influence it may have.” 176
Private entities that collect personal data as an exchange for some service, such as providing search results or access to a social media platform,
have no economic interest in protecting user privacy. Instead, their interest
rests in preserving trust. Virtually all human interactions rest on some modicum of trust as “trust is a transaction catalyst.” 177 “The information economy[, whether it is providing a credit card with a transaction or interacting
with a website,] is premised on the sharing of personal information; it is ‘mediated by information relationships’ to a far greater extent than prior economies.” 178 We are told to be wary of “untrusted” sites, understanding that
such sites may compromise data we wish to keep private. While the public
tends to have a short memory, or is simply forgiving, as evident by consumers returning to Target after its big data breach, or to Facebook after its
172. Richterich, supra note 17, at 3.
173. Id. at 65.
174. Id. at 9.
175. Id. at 62.
176. Regan, supra note 103, at 1038 (citing Zeynep Tufekci, Opinion, Mark Zuckerberg Is
in Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/opinion/markzuckerberg-is-in-denial.html [https://perma.cc/QY3R-54US]).
177. Savage, supra note 141, at 121.
178. Hirsch, supra note 23, at 83.
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Cambridge Analytics fiasco, most believe that “if trust absorbs too many
body blows, it can crash.” 179 Simply, “online entities . . . are not competing
to provide consumers with an optimal level of privacy; they are cooperating
in an effort to ensure that the level of consumer trust doesn’t sink so low that
people stop coming online.” 180

VI. WHY AN INDIVIDUALIST APPROACH TO PRIVACY DOES NOT
WORK
As discussed at length above, what falls within the concept of privacy
is subject to debate, and there is really no shared definition. 181 At a minimum, privacy distinguishes what we choose to make part of our social self
and what we separate therefrom. This demarcation is contextual. 182 That
portion of our private thought, feeling and beliefs that we share—what we
make social—with friends, neighbors, merchants, doctors, accountants, and
lawyers, or simply the public at large in the form of a tweet or post, is likely
very different in each instance.
The Enlightenment taught Western societies that an individual’s private thoughts, beliefs, and desires have value. 183 This logically led to
179. Id. at 84.
180. Savage, supra note 141, at 98.
181. One reason for this may be that what we refer to as privacy in this context has little to
do with what privacy actually means. Considering its entomology, “[t]he word private . . . comes
from the L[atin] privus (perhaps from prce), existing for itself, single, by itself. In the old Latin it
was synonymous with singulus. Then from privus was formed the verb privo, privavi, privatum,
privare, to set free from anything, to separate from anything or any one.” Thus, privacy is a demarcation and not a thing. JAMES MITCHELL, SIGNIFICANT ETYMOLOGY: OR ROOTS, STEMS, AND
BRANCHES OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 214 (William Blackwood & Sons, 1908).
182. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 232 (“Helen Nissenbaum
argues that one should go beyond the control theory and the access theory of privacy to consider
privacy as contextual integrity. Contextual integrity is a heuristic that analyzes changes of information processes in specific contexts and flags departures from entrenched privacy practices as
violations of contextual integrity. One then analyzes if these new practices have moral superiority
and if the privacy violation is therefore morally legitimate”). HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 164, 182 (Stan. U. Press
ed. 2010). Contextual privacy is “preserved when informational norms are respected and violated
when informational norms are breached . . . . [W]hether or not control is appropriate depends on
the context, the types of information, the subject, sender, and recipient.” Id. at 140, 148.
183. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 406 (“Most dominant theories of privacy view it
through the lens of individualism.”).

SCHAEFFER_MACROS_V3_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

PRIVACY AS A COLLECTIVE NORM

5/16/2021 11:29 PM

289

conceptualizing what we deem “private” as property. This historic understanding of privacy as property has biased our approach to privacy in the
digital age, extending its reach beyond the things we possess separate from
society. Specifically, as “property,” what is deemed private is a commodity
that can be freely traded by individuals with informed consent. 184
What is now clear, however, is that this approach rests on several false
assumptions. First, it falsely assumes that, armed with adequate information,
individuals can make rational choices. It is generally accepted that we cannot. 185 Second, it falsely assumes that an individual’s personal privacy demarcations have meaning. They do not. As social beings, our personal privacy demarcation is dependent upon the privacy decisions of others, most
notably our own family, friends, and acquaintances. Simply put, even if one
sought maximum privacy, much of what one sought to protect could be penetrated by Big Data simply based on the more lenient privacy decisions of
those with whom that person associates. Our current approach to protecting
privacy is to anonymize what is collected and to require that its collection be
subject to informed consent. This structure, however, simply does not work.
First, simply removing someone’s name or address from data has become all but meaningless. 186 “This is due to three sea changes: the number
of datasets that can be cross-referenced has grown; the data itself has become
richer; and, as a result, the algorithms that succeeded in creating ‘noise’ in
datasets to prevent re-identification are no longer effective.” 187 For example,
one study demonstrates “that 87 percent of the U.S. population can be
uniquely identified just from zip code, gender, and date of birth.” 188 Research also consistently shows that “[i]t is possible to use non-personal data
184. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 9 (“Regulatory regimes in the United States and Europe
have taken a similar approach toward data protection since the 1970s, giving individuals the right
to make decisions about how to manage their data.”).
185. Jay Pil Choi et al., Privacy and Personal Data Collection with Information Externalities, 173 J. PUB. ECON. 113, 24 (2019) (“Currently, most countries’ privacy regulation and law are
based on ‘informed consent’ approach. This approach finds its justification on the premise that an
individual’s informed consent provides legitimacy for any information collection and its use. Despite its intuitive appeal, there has been wide criticism against such approach.”).
186. “Anonymity is no longer central. As it becomes near-impossible, and maybe even
irrelevant, we must rethink what we intend to protect when we speak of protecting privacy.” Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 50.
187. Id. at 46.
188. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 390.
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to make predictions of a sensitive nature such as sexual orientation and financial status.” 189 Thus, while:
U.S. federal regulations do not allow financial institutions to
discriminate in the pricing of and access to credits based on
personal attributes such as racial, ethnicity or other
characteristics[, t]echnological advancements have made possible
for lending companies to mine online and offline data and make
offers only to populations with credit attractiveness. 190
As mentioned above, the value of Big Data commercially, socially, and politically is not tying a piece of data to Alice, Bob, or Carol, but connecting
them to a “type: a skier, a dog lover, a bank manager, [or] ‘[p]eople who
bought this also bought [that].’” 191
Big data exploits “homophily,” the principle that people are likely to
interact with others who are similar to them, meaning that “from people’s
communication networks we can identify their contacts’ likely ‘ethnicity,
gender, income, political views and more.’” 192 “‘Even if you are looking at
purely anonymized data on the use of mobile phones, carriers could predict
your age to within some cases plus or minus one year with over 70 percent
accuracy. They can predict your gender with between 70 and 80 percent
accuracy.’” 193 This is not to say we should completely dispense with the
requirement that data be anonymized. Instead, “[i]n the age of Big Data and
information inferred ab extra, the traditional right to informational privacy
[, data anonymity,] no longer provides sufficient protection to the individual;
it focuses solely on information collection rather than analysis, and can thus
no longer be a fully effective instrument of control.” 194 Stated more simply,
while anonymity “may allow the individual to hide within the crowd, [it]

189. Kshetri, supra note 41, at 1140.
190. Id. at 1148.
191. Taylor et. al., supra note 8, at 10.
192. Taylor, supra note 59, at 17.
193. Id. at 17–18.
194. Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 46.
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cannot conceal the crowd itself. We may be profiled in actionable ways
without being personally identified.” 195
The addition of individualized informed consent is similarly insufficient in today’s digital landscape. Informed consent has been the cornerstone
of human research. 196 “This approach finds its justification on the premise
that an individual’s informed consent provides legitimacy for any information collection and its use.” 197 Extending this principal to public and private transactions made sense when computing systems were mostly centralized and people “had little need to exercise their data-control rights on an ongoing basis.” 198 The key premise is that individuals have some control over
what information is collected about them and how it will be used. 199 This
transactional approach—a bargained-for exchange—fits nicely with the historic notion of privacy being the personal property of an individual and, consistent with a capitalist system, that privacy should be something that each
individual can exchange with limited governmental interference. This falls
in line with “the general belief of economic liberalism that individual choice
in markets will lead to the best global outcome.” 200
Most today, however, question the effectiveness of this approach. 201
Some suggest the problem is “that privacy notices are rarely read, and even
if read, not easy to fully understand.” 202 Simply educating users, however,
yields diminishing returns. 203 This is because:
[T]he idea that consumers can make meaningful choices about
online privacy is practically a poster child for the behavioral
economic critique of standard microeconomics. People aren’t
195. Taylor, supra note 59, at 13–14.
196. Richterich, supra note 17, at 42.
197. Choi et al., supra note 185, at 24.
198. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 9.
199. Savage, supra note 141, at 106.
200. De Wolf et al., supra note 10, at 4.
201. Choi et al., supra note 185, at 24.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 409.
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good at bargaining over complex, contingent, or uncertain future
costs and benefits of the sort arising from online surveillance; no
such bargaining occurs in fact; and it’s not clear why rights in
information arising from interactions between an individual and
an online entity belong to the individual (to be bargained over)
rather than the entity (to be exploited at will). 204
“Most individuals understand neither the data stores they are helping to create nor the ways in which data analysts can use such information to produce
actionable insights.” 205 At best, “individual-centric regulatory structure[s
give] modern users of digital technologies . . . [the] illusion of control
through consent notices . . . [and] ad-preference” controls. 206
There obviously exists a tradeoff between strong privacy protection and
the economic and social benefits we as a society derive from Big Data.
When asked, individuals usually state strong preferences for protecting privacy. Those same individuals, however, consistently fail to act in accordance with that preference, something commonly referred to as the privacy
paradox. 207 True, there are some—likely well-educated and affluent—who
are technologically adept and can make a rational decision here. Following
known societal preferences, and in the absence of true altruism, these individuals will adopt more robust privacy protections for themselves, despite
knowing that if everyone adopted the same informed approach, the economic
and social benefit we achieve as a society from Big Data would suffer. 208
Accepting that Big Data provides a social benefit to society as a whole, these
individuals gain all of the benefits of Big Data, while not sharing in its costs.
Research shows that:

204. Savage, supra note 141, at 98.
205. Hirsch, supra note 23, at 75.
206. De Mooy, supra note 39, at 18.
207. Garratt & van Oordt, supra note 161, at 3.
208. “The result is a form of a prisoner’s dilemma situation: while each consumer has a
private incentive to opt out of intrusive marketing, when all consumers do this, price competition
is relaxed and consumers are harmed . . . . If our perusal of the theoretical economic literature on
privacy has revealed one robust lesson, it is that the economic consequences of less privacy and
more information sharing for the parties involved (the data subject and the actual or potential data
holder) can in some cases be welfare enhancing, while, in others, welfare diminishing.” Acquisti
et. al., supra note 23, at 460, 462.
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Big [D]ata is likely to affect the welfare of unsophisticated,
vulnerable, and technologically unsavvy consumers more
negatively. Such consumers may lack awareness of multiple
information sources and are less likely to receive up to date and
accurate information about multiple suppliers in a manner that
facilitates effective search and comparisons. They are also not in
a position to assess the degree of sensitiveness of their online
actions and are more likely to be tricked by illicit actors. 209
Even more troubling, however, is the suggestion that laws regulating privacy
will always “systematically favor the interests of sophisticated consumers . . . since sophisticated consumers are on the whole more politically engaged people who pay attention to legislative policy proposals and vote their
interests.” 210
These consumers arguably think they will lose nothing from
policies that allow firms to access their data … and are likely to
make the necessary efforts to fight against businesses’
informational advantage. Some argue that the general public
outside this group may not necessarily be a ‘winner’ in economic
or other terms in corporations’ [B]ig [D]ata initiatives that rely on
‘data accessibility and manipulation.’ 211
Even with respect to the sophisticated users who want to optimize personal
privacy, it is doubtful whether one can participate in society today without
losing some level of control over personal data, commonly referred to as the
ever-increasing cost of maintaining privacy. 212 Unless one makes judicious
use of cryptocurrency and tor browsing, 213 it is virtually impossible to engage in anonymous digital transactions. Because platforms like LinkedIn
have become so ubiquitous in business, a candidate’s failure to have a profile

209. Kshetri, supra note 41, at 1152.
210. Id. at 1143.
211. Id.
212. Garratt & van Oordt, supra note 161, at 26–27.
213. A “Tor Browser” is a web browser that anonymizes the user’s web traffic using the
Tor network. TOR (2021), www.torproject.org.
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on the platform could be seen as a red flag. 214 Moreover, communication by
its very nature is always at least a two-way transaction. Even if one always
prefers the most secure, privacy protecting options, those with whom they
communicate may not be as judicious.
Engaging with social media is therefore not an individual choice.
It is an inevitable outcome of being in almost any social situation.
Location information is a particularly powerful example of how
one person’s data can affect others. Cell phones track individuals’
location precisely, and by proxy, the locations of others. 215
Today, one has essentially no choice but to pass information over a platform
that others can observe. Some suggest, therefore, that no reasonable expectation of privacy can possibly exist anymore, but our social norms clearly
suggest that we as a society do not agree. 216
This latter point demonstrates the implicit failing of any individualistic
informed consent approach. “By conceiving privacy as individual right, liberal privacy conceptions fail to grasp the social existence of humans.” 217
Stated colloquially, “every middle schooler understands that a fundamental
problem of privacy online is not what one says about oneself, but what others
say.” 218 While there may be some thoughts and actions that truly occur in
private, most of our intimacies are shared with others. We share our
thoughts, feeling, and action to varying degrees with friends, loved ones, and
professionals with some varying expectation of privacy. That privacy, however, depends on the other sharing that same expectation. An extreme example of the violation of a shared expectation of privacy, which already
prompted explicit regulation, is revenge porn.
An individualist approach does not address the fact that “Big Data allows governments and businesses to track the habits and movements of
groups, combine and recombine people into categories, and analyze and

214. Barocas & Levy, supra note 42, at 583.
215. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 402.
216. Id. at 576.
217. Towards An Alternative Concept of Privacy, supra note 6, at 226.
218. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 396.
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attempt to predict their behavior.” 219 When one user consents to information-gathering, that user becomes a conduit for gathering information
about their entire social network, regardless of members’ consent. 220 Pushed
further, when one consents to share information, certain inferences can be
drawn with others who share one or more traits with that person, even if the
two have never met and are completely oblivious that they both have been
collected into a group. 221
[D]ata is no longer gathered about one specific individual or a
small group of people, but rather about large and undefined
groups. Data is analyzed on the basis of patterns and group
profiles; the results are often used for general policies and applied
on a large scale. The fact that the individual is no longer central,
but incidental to these types of processes, challenges the very
foundations of most currently existing legal, ethical and social
practices and theories. 222
Scholars point to this social nature of our existence as the “nail in the coffin
of the individualistic, notice-and-consent model of privacy regulation.” 223
The current individualist, informed consent approach to privacy is
prophylactic at best. However, Big Tech’s concern that the more restrictive
opt-in approaches of the GDPR and CCPA will cause economic harm is not
necessarily without merit. Research suggests that even a fully informed rational consumer who makes an optimal decision with respect to their privacy
may not make the decision that is in the best interest of society on a macroeconomic scale. 224 Moreover, because privacy is both contextual and relational, each individual must make innumerable discrete privacy decisions,
219. Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 50.
220. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 410.
221. “Big Data allows governments and businesses to track the habits and movements of
groups, combine and recombine people into categories, and analyze and attempt to predict their
behavior. Individual data is no longer only useful for gaining information about and targeting the
individual, but also – and perhaps above all – for gaining information about and targeting groups.”
Kammourieh et al., supra note 5, at 50.
222. Taylor et. al, supra note 8, at 13–14.
223. Barocas & Levy, supra note 42, at 561.
224. Id.
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which not only impact them, but others as well. It is simply irrational to
conclude that each member of society in each such instance can make a fully
informed, rational decision that is maximizing for each member of a society. 225
Recognizing the inherent failings of the individualist approach, governments have suggested that Big Tech simply regulate itself. Surprisingly,
Big Tech has been unable to formulate any rational proposal to get itself out
of its current predicament other than to express a willingness to be regulated. 226 What is clear, however, is that efficiencies demand a holistic approach that maximizes privacy, economic efficiency, and the free flow of
cultural information within a society. There is no objectively correct demarcation of what society determines to be the optimal balance between privacy
and access. Any determination will necessarily be political. What is clear,
however, is that leaving this decision to us as individuals is suboptimal, as is
regulating this demarcation on an instance-by-instance basis.

VII. HOW TO TREAT OUR CONTRIBUTION TO OUR SOCIETY
“How data is [characterized] affects how it is perceived, . . . which in
turn influences [our] expectations” of how it should be treated. 227 A common
refrain is that Big Data has replaced Big Oil as the world’s most valuable
asset. 228 This comparison, along with the notion that data is discovered and
mined, however, is not neutral. Instead, it supports the supposition that data
is something that can (or should) be owned by its collector. 229
Big Data shares little with oil. While oil is finite and scarce, Data is
not, with increasing amounts produced and collected each day. Where oil is
225. “Work on relational privacy recognizes that different privacy expectations attach to
different people and institutions in our lives, and suggests that law should take into account these
different sensitivities in setting rules about such expectations (for example, by recognizing that we
may have a greater interest in privacy against the government than we do against our neighbors).”
See id. at 560.
226. Isaac, supra note 4.
227. Scholz, supra note 45, at 875–76.
228. Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at n.6; see also The World’s Most Valuable Resource
is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017) https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017
/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data
[https://perma.cc/G2SHZBT5].
229. Scholz, supra note 45, at 876.
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rivalrous, with many players vying for its limited supply, multiple people or
entities can simultaneously use the same data set(s) without degradation.
Where oil is essentially fungible, data sets are not; a data set of movie preferences is not interchangeable with medical records. Where oil is consumed
upon use, data can be used over and over again for different purposes. 230
Finally, oil is clearly a good, created over millions of years with limited input
from contemporary society. 231 Big Data is not. Instead, it reflects our collective preferences, statements, and actions. Unlike oil, the value of Big Data
is its ability to reflect who we are.
Irrespective of the fact that the analogy of data to oil collapses under
the slightest scrutiny, the notion of data as property is longstanding and persists. 232 As private property, economists have struggled to identify its relative price.
Should the reference point be the price one would accept to give
away their data, or the amount they would pay to protect it? Or,
should it be the expected cost the data subject may suffer if her
data is exposed, or the expected profit the data holder can generate
from acquiring her personal information? 233
What we do know, however, is that not only is privacy contextual, “[a]ttitudes towards privacy mainly capture subjective preferences,” meaning that
there is no objective way to value privacy, in the way we can determine that
a Mercedes Benz costs more than a Hyundai. 234 In fact, some scholars go so
far as to suggest that characterizing privacy as property that can be bargained
for, “create[s] a false bargain, in which individuals could accept money in
return for giving up on their inalienable privacy rights.” 235
Despite these analytical difficulties, it is still helpful to consider privacy
as property in some respects. The Nobel Prize-winning economist Elanor
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id. at 10–11.
232. “Likening data ownership to traditional property ownership is well-trodden ground.”
De Mooy, supra note 39, at 26.
233. Acquisti et. al, supra note 23, at 447.
234. Id.
235. Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at 10.
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Ostrom narrowed the attributes of property to two dimensions: excludability
and rivalry. 236 “Excludability refers to the extent which someone can legally
prevent another from accessing a good; rivalry, refers to whether one person’s consumption of a good impinges on another person’s consumption of
that same good.” 237 While excludability is the product of law, regulation,
contract, or norm, rivalry refers to the product itself. These two attributes
form four categories of property, under which virtually all property falls.
Private property is both rivalrous and exclusionary. Property that is not exclusive and is consumable would be a common pooled resource, like the fish
stock in an ocean or a common grazing land, are referred to as “commons.” 238 Commons are relatively uncommon in the U.S. where “[m]arkets,
private hierarchies (firms), and/or public ones (governments) are the
norm.” 239 Public goods are those that are neither rivalrous nor exclusionary,
like the air we breathe, street lights or fire departments. 240 While such property is not subject to elimination by consumption, it can be destroyed by misuse (environmental contamination) or a lack of collective investment (failing
to adequately fund a fire department). Finally, there is property that is nonrivalrous but exclusionary, such as a county club or a toll road. 241
As discussed above, our bias has been to view what we do, say, and
like as individualistic private property, which resulted in our current informed consent regulatory schemes. 242 These schemes, however, do not
seem to align well with the practical economic, social, or cultural realities of
Big Data. Instead, today, Big Data, the collection of what we do, say, and
like, is more analogous to a country club. A few control this “property,” but
236. VINCENT OSTROM & ELINOR OSTROM, ALTERNATIVES FOR DELIVERING PUBLIC
SERVICES: TOWARD IMPROVED PERFORMANCE 7–49 (Emanuel Savas ed., 1977).
237. Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at 6.
238. “‘The basic characteristic that distinguishes commons from non-commons is institutionalized sharing of resources among members of a community.’” Sanfilippo et. al., supra note
14 (manuscript at 4) (original emphasis omitted).
239. Savage, supra note 141, at 117–18.
240. Dibley & Cole, supra note 46, at 7.
241. Id.
242. “The legal literature on data and property has most often started from the assumption
that data has private goods characteristics, and then considers the bundle of property rights that
might attach given that construct.” Id. at 6.
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their collection, use, and disposition does not consume other members’ collection, use, and disposition of the same.
Much has already been written attempting to analogize our current privacy predicament—the fact that our current regulations do not adequately
implement our social, economic, and cultural goals—to a tragedy of commons. Economic analysis shows that when property is rivalrous but not exclusionary, a society will tend to over-consume beyond sustainability leading
to collapse, such as overfishing and deforestation. 243 Since Big Data is defined by its vastness and velocity, the notion of such data collapsing due to
overconsumption does not make sense.
Others have attempted to re-conceptualize property commons relevance to privacy as a trust commons. 244 This reasoning suggests that as personal data is exploited, we will lose trust in the collectors. The privacy paradox mentioned above along with individuals’ lack of understanding of how
their personal data is being exploited suggests that such a social change is
unlikely. However, a regulatory adoption of this analogy might lead to a
scheme that fails to adequately consider the economic and social values of
this resource.
Finally, what we do, say, and like has been analogized to a public good.
While “public good” property in the economic sense is not rivalrous in that
consumption by one does not prevent consumption by another, it does create
tension between selfishness and cooperation. 245 The free-rider dilemma,
which is endemic to a public good—where everyone wants the benefit but
not the burden—elegantly offers an explanation for “why everyone might
deeply cherish privacy, yet still contribute to privacy-damaging stores of
data, just as everyone likes clean air, but individuals still pollute.” 246 The
public good analogy from a more legal perspective is similarly helpful. It is
similar to the manner in which societies see investments in infrastructure,
education, and healthcare as beneficial to the society as a whole rather than
simply the individual receiving the public benefit at the moment. This notion
of public good brings an egalitarian focus to the problem of how we maximize the value of property that is neither rivalrous nor exclusionary. The question becomes: what should societies’ investment be here?
243. Hirsch, supra note 23, at 77–78.
244. See Savage, supra note 141, at 99.
245. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 65, at 414–15.
246. Id. at 400.
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In addition to the investment a society decides to make in a particular
public good, we must still decide how it can be utilized, balancing preferences to best match the norms of a society. A holistic, egalitarian approach
to our privacy dilemma seems suited to address the problems that “(1) different stakeholders—including businesses, consumers, and governments—
each have different, multilayered, and often conflicting objectives; [and] (2)
information technologies, privacy concerns, and the economics of privacy
evolve constantly, with no single study or policy intervention being able to
fully account for future (and even some present) concerns.” 247 This does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that more regulation is necessary, bu instead, allows us to critically examine whether our current regulations actually optimize the norms we seek. As one “school of thought holds,” our
currently informed consent model “inhibits technology diffusion by imposing costs upon the exchange of information,” while another argues that “explicit privacy protection promotes the use of information technology by reassuring potential adopters that their data will be safe.” 248
Regardless of whether what we do, say, and like is actually property in
any sense, the means by which we differentiate types of property is enlightening. It also returns us to the Coarse Theorem. 249 We must start from our
present situation and realize that any change will necessarily inflict harm.
The goal is not simply to minimize the harm, such as by outlawing cattle
grazing because of the damage it causes a neighbor’s vegetable farm. Instead, the goal is “to avoid the more serious harm.” 250 “When an economist
is comparing alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to compare the total social product yielded by these different arrangements.” 251
What we know is that our current scheme of incident-specific regulations
(e.g., HIPPA) and a reliance on individuals’ decisions maximizing social
welfare (informed consent) are simply not adequate.

247. Acquisti et. al., supra note 23, at 478.
248. Id. at 469.
249. See Coase, supra note 19.
250. Id. at 2.
251. Id. at 34.
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VIII. PRIVACY AS A SOCIAL NORM
This Article is not bold enough to provide complete answers. Instead,
its goal is to point out the economic, social, and cultural value to what we
do, say, and like, and to demonstrate the disconnect between our current regulatory scheme and the realities of Big Data (the repository of what we do,
say, and like). Today, tools exist to capture virtually every aspect of our
lives, and based on their adoption, we view them and the data they capture
as having normative value. The issue remaining is whether the price we pay
for that value is economically and socially fair.
Another property analogy is valuable here. Article 1, section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution expressly empowers Congress “[t]o promote the [p]rogress
of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and
[i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.” 252 Virtually every other nation shares this norm: that society should
reward those who contribute their ideas to the advancement of a nation creatively or intellectually. In this same way, those who developed the means
to capture, store, and analyze what we say, do, and like should be rewarded
for that effort. The reward, however, must be normatively just.
No country gives a citizen a perpetual monopoly over an idea they contribute to society. Instead, each nation has decided to bestow a reward commensurate with the contribution, typically defined by time. Here, by contrast, those who collect what we do, say, and like are given a perpetual
monopoly over this data. Research shows that this data gives those who
control it a distinct economic advantage over any competitor. While research
shows that our contribution of what we do, say, and like has value, and further questions whether the current bargained-for exchange is economically
fair, there seems to be little evaluation of whether the value societies award
to those who collect this data—an absolute monopoly—is normatively justified. In other words, does awarding a monopoly fit our existing societal
norms? Would most people agree that the Amazons, Googles, and Facebooks of the world should have a monopoly? In contrast to those who contribute unique ideas (patent) or original expression (copyright) those who
collect, store, process, and control Big Data are merely salvagers, having
found unique ways of culling value from what otherwise would have been

252. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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lost. 253 Considered this way, few would suggest that a salvager of what we
do, say, and like is entitled to an award greater than an author or inventor.
By the same token, however, a time-limited monopoly over collected data
makes little sense due the nature and value of the good.
In addition to questions about what we sacrifice for the collecting, storing, and processing of what we do, say, and like, there are serious questions
about whether what we receive as a society for the private control over Big
Data is fair. While not a perfect analogy, a connection can be drawn between
the value of our collective actions, statements, and preferences and the radio
spectrum. Historically, the analog broadcast spectrum was narrow, a limited
resource, and we collectively decided to empower a public agency—the
FCC—to determine how best to maximize its value consistent with our social
norms, i.e., the public good. Similar to our privacy, consumers, creators, and
distributors not only had competing interests with each other, but also
amongst themselves. Rather than simply rely on the market or the ability of
targeted legislation to identify and maximize social, economic, and cultural
norms, the U.S. created the FCC to address the broadcast spectrum in a holistic manner. The FCC, however, took a hands-off approach with respect to
the digital realm.
Despite our preference for private property and our bias towards believing that the invisible hand of a free market will maximize our collective
goals and desires, it simply has not worked with respect to Big Data. Not
only have individuals, other than the technologically adept, shown themselves unable to make decisions in their own best interest, nothing suggests
they can make privacy decisions that maximize the public’s interest. More
troubling is the notion that our existing scheme is biased, favoring the
wealthy, informed, and intelligent. The privileged class derives all of Big
Data’s benefits while shifting the burden to those less well-off. Irrespective
of this moral issue, individual privacy decisions have been proven as all but
irrelevant to what data is collected about an individual. Today, our participation in society, both socially and economically, is not only dependent upon
our own use of tools that compromise our privacy, but the tools used by others which also compromise our privacy irrespective of our own diligence.
To remove these tools, or to prevent their use to mine what we do, say, and
like, is probably no longer an option.
Regulators have thrown up their hands and suggested that those responsible for collecting, storing, and analyzing Big Data—the Amazons,
253. “The purpose of salvage award policy is to promote not only humanitarian rescue of
life and property but maritime commerce as well, by preserving property from destruction.”
Scholz, supra note 45, at 880–81.
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Googles, and Facebooks—simply regulate themselves. These private entities in turn have pleaded for regulation but have failed to propose any alternative structure to replace our individualist, informed consent approach.
What is proposed here is to replace our individualist approach with an
egalitarian one. Such an approach would conceive of privacy collectively
rather than individually, acknowledge that privacy is both contextual and relational, and consider the value of what we do, say, and like a public good.
Because we, the people, create that good, we should demand that this good
be placed under the supervision of us through a regulatory entity in the spirit
of the FCC: a governing body established to determine how information
about what we do, say, and like is accessed and used, guided by “the public
interest, convenience or necessity.” 254 Like the FCC, this body would ensure
that those with access to what we do, say, and like use that information as a
trustee for the public that contributes to and benefits from this public good.
IX. CONCLUSION
Precisely what such a regulatory scheme would look like, and the
breadth and scope of its powers, is beyond the scope of this Article—though
expanding on the ramifications of this change of focus, if valid, is plainly
necessary. The point here has been simply to demonstrate that what we do,
say, and like is more akin to a collective norm than private property. If what
we do, say, and like is a collective norm, an individualist notice/consent
model for regulation, however structured, will never make sense. It is a quixotic attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole.
What we do, say, and like is who we are. It defines us socially, economically, and culturally. Considered this way, it is not suitable to treat this
good as something that we each can individually bargain away to be placed
under the exclusive control of a few private companies. The current system—which relies on individual choice—is neither optimal nor sustainable.
Thus, our ability to collectively benefit from Big Data depends on our willingness to conceive of data privacy collectively and—based on that understanding—to seek a better way of regulating it.

254. Waldman, supra note 104, at 280.

